A new book seeks to salvage the reputation of Joe Modise
MARK LEVIN
Days before Joe Modise died in November 2001, President Thabo Mbeki arrived at the Modise home to carry out a deathbed award of the “Order of the Star of South Africa (non military) class1: Grand Cross (Gold).
Some wondered why the award was made so desperately late in the day since Modise had been in declining health for so long, detractors who had been grieving away at his reputation, questioned whether he actually deserved the award.
His name has remained tarnished partly because his admirers have been unable to satisfactorily refute all the allegations against him and partly because the arms deal has remained in the public eye with former President Jacob Zuma ducks in and out of court for the very same matter.
One of his daughters, Boipuso Modise, has spoken of the unrelenting vilification in the decades since her father’s death, struggling to reconcile her lived experience of him with the persistently negative narrative.
In response the family wanted a more accurate depiction of a man who they believe deserves greater recognition “among present and future generations”.
In 2020 they approached Ronnie Kasrils and requested that he work with son-in-law Fidelis Hove to produce a book which would reveal the other side of Modise.
The result is Comrade and Commander: The life and times of Joe Modise, compiled by Ronnie Kasrils and Fidelis Hove (Jacana, 2024).
Their approach has been to interview 50 people who knew Modise to varying degrees, extracting and interweaving the relevant passages to give a more or less chronological journey of his life. It is not then, a standard biography.
Kasrils had known Modise most of his adult life. He was just 22, “ a young white boy, new to the liberation movement” when, nervously, he first met Modise in 1962. They would eventually become lifelong friends.
As Gonda Perez, a dentist who knew them in Zambia’s capital, Lusaka noted, their relationship was “one of camaraderie, teasing and loving one another, pure brotherhood.
Kasrils has long defended Modise in a genuine belief that his friend has been unfairly maligned. As he remarks in the introduction, the book aims to celebrate and understand who Modise was and what he achieved. The selection of the “50 voices” has then been carefully made: rarely is there criticism and then it is muted.
Born in 1929, Modise left school early to earn a living, finding full- time employment as a Putco bus driver. He would later gain a matric through part-time study. He joined the ANC youth league in 1947 and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) on its creation in 1961, becoming it’s commander in 1965, a position he would retain until MK’s incorporation into the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). When president Mandela appointed Modise as Defence Minister in 1944, Kasrils was his deputy.
Whatever one’s view is of Modise as MK commander, he held onto the position, adroitly negotiating the tensions between the military and political structures for nearly 30 years.
Each of those interviewed who served with him in exile speak of his leadership qualities, his presence, the aura, the determination. When it appeared that MK might split, “Modise was the only man who was able to keep MK together.”
Tshinga Dubewho was a Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army commander (ZPRA), observed that there were many ZPRA commanders, but MK had Modise right up until 1994. “It showed how resilient he was.” Many noted that he was also very strict, even unrelenting about discipline. Some who felt that he was brutal ignored the paranoia in the camps. On this point, Pallo Jordan criticised Modise for seeming to surrender to the dominant paranoiac mood. He warned that the ANC would have to answer and account for the crimes committed by its security structure.
On the other hand, Sue Rabkin who also knew Modise in Lusaka in the 1980’s, wrote that the only two comrades of whom she heard almost no criticism were Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu. She then added that “while abuse did take place, it was not approved of. Moreover, it was not sanctioned.” Does the evidence support her bare statement?.
One can but wonder what Modise’s reputation might have been had he not been Defence Minister for five years, but had served in a different portfolio. His term though was not without its achievements.
Integrating the former adversaries into a single Defence Force was a tough necessity. While beset with difficulties the new SANDF managed to hold together. A sufficient level of trust was created to overcome the distrust. In giving much of the credit to Modise, Kasrils may be downplaying his own contribution.
Conscription, which had never been popular, collapsed and was officially ended. The regiments reverted to their historic volunteer reserve force status, but deprived of funding, they entered a long period of decline.
The question of funding the SANDF in peacetime usually implies that its percentage of the national budget would decline “the peace dividend”.
Nevertheless, a Defence Force will need to upgrade its equipment and weaponry from time to time. This was the thinking behind the Strategic Arms Acquisition Package- the Arms Deal.
Questions soon arose over the necessity and suitability of all the proposed equipment and, of course, the significant cost.
The Secretary for Defence, Pierre Steyn, in a carefully worded written submission states that he experienced the interference of Modise in the arms acquisition process first hand.
“His manipulation of recommendations was often inconsistent with statutory prescripts.”
Although Steyn acknowledges that Modise handled the difficult position of Defence Minister with aplomb, he also observed that he did not take kindly to opposition and expected unquestioned obedience of his orders.
Despite raising his concerns, including in private meetings with Modise, Steyn believed his position had been compromised.
He requested that the Minister relieve him from his five-year contract. This was granted.
Another high-ranking critic was the Chief of SANDF, General Georg Meiring, who is negatively referenced in this book. There is no contribution from him: whether he was not approached or declined to be interviewed is relevant.
What is also not mentioned is that both he and Steyn were so concerned about aspects of the arms deal that they both wrote to President Mandela.
Reams have been written about the arms deal, most of it negative. If the compilers hoped that glowing tributes to Modise would burnish his name posthumously, they are going to be disillusioned. Too many aspects are side-stepped while some contributors have their own reputations to protect, as well as that of the ANC.
Kasrils has said that the government was somewhat naive. It was surely more than that.
As a compilation of interviews from those who were there, it will benefit future historians seeking primary source material. The book's best impact is on the personal level. Modise was not comfortable in the limelight. Away from the media, those close to him describe a warm, compassionate family man.
His daughter Boipuso recalled that you could not walk by without giving him a hug. Living in exile meant his youngest daughters never knew South Africa until the family returned.
Lesedi saw Zambia as her home and wanted to go back. Even in Zambia they only saw their father sporadically. Who could not be touched by Boipuso (who loved Tom and Jerry cartoons) recounting her memory of coming home from school and hearing “Tom and Jerry playing? She knew her father was home and that they could watch it together.
Modise certainly emerges as a more rounded man, whose qualities could inspire affection, loyalty and admiration. Yet, despite the best of intentions behind this book, he will remain a controversial man whose detractors are not going to be silenced.